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Artistic Value is Attributive Goodness 
It is common to distinguish between attributive and predicative uses of adjectives. 
Consider the following: 
        
1. Emma is left-wing       
2. Emma is a left-wing Tory 
3. James is well mannered    
4. James is a well mannered 5-year-old 
1 and 3 are predicative uses of ‘left-wing’ and ‘well mannered’ respectively, while 2 
and 4 are attributive uses. A central way in which attributive uses differ from predica-
tive uses is in what kinds of entailments they license. This thought is captured in two 
tests for attributive uses of adjectives: 
 Geach test : An occurrence of ‘A’ is attributive if  1
 ‘X is an A B’  
 doesn’t entail ‘X is A’ 
 (e.g. ‘James is a well mannered 5-year-old’ doesn’t entail ‘James is well  
 mannered’. Compare ‘X is a red car, so X is red’)’ 
 Thomson test : An occurrence of ‘A’ is attributive if  2
 ‘X is an A B’, and  
 ‘X is a C’,  
 don’t jointly entail ‘X is an A C’ 
 (e.g. ‘James is a tall 5-year-old’, and ‘James is a British citizen’ doesn’t entail 
 ‘James is a tall British citizen’. Compare ‘X is a red car, and X is an object 
 owned by Sarah, so X is a red object owned by Sarah’). 
One application of the attributive-predicative distinction that has been of particular 
interest to philosophers is its application to the term ‘good’. Consider the following: 
 5. Well-being is good 
 6. Compassion is good 
 7. That is a good knife 
 8. You are a good dancer 
 9. The Tomahawk cruise missile is a good bomb 
7-9 are attributive uses of ‘good’. They pass both tests for attributive uses. From ‘you 
are a good dancer’, and ‘you are an accountant’, it doesn’t follow that you are a good 
 See Geach (1956) ‘Good and Evil’ Analysis1
 See Thomson (2008) Normativity, pp. 3-6.2
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accountant. From ‘that is a good knife’ and ‘that is a birthday present’ it doesn’t fol-
low that that is a good birthday present.  From ‘that is a good bomb’ and ‘that is a 
thing designed in the 20th Century.’, it doesn’t follow that that is a good thing de-
signed in the 20th Century. And calling something a good knife, a good bomb, or call-
ing someone a good dancer, does not commit you to saying that thing or person is 
good.  
The attributive-predicative distinction as I’ve spelled it out is a semantic distinction - 
it’s a distinction between two ways of using a term. But philosophers sometimes talk 
in terms of a corresponding metaphysical distinction: predicative goodness = whatev-
er gets ascribed to something with a predicative use of ‘good’; attributive goodness = 
whatever gets ascribed to something with an attributive use of ‘good’. On this way of 
speaking, predicative goodness is the property of being good, while attributive good-
ness is the property of being a good K, for some kind K. There are many kinds of at-
tributive goodness - as many, in fact, as there are goodness-fixing kinds: being a good 
dancer is one kind of attributive goodness, being a good job application is another, 
and so on.  Since being a good K does not entail being good, attributive goodness is 3
no guarantee of predicative goodness. And since being a good K and a J doesn’t entail 
being a good J, having one kind of attributive goodness is no guarantee of having an-
other kind. 
In this paper I apply the distinction between attributive goodness and predicative 
goodness in aesthetics - I argue there are good reasons to think that artistic value is a 
kind of attributive goodness, and that recognising this promises to shed new light on a 
number of central debates in aesthetics. The paper is organised as follows: in §1 I say 
more about the attributive-predicative distinction, and make a case for thinking that 
artistic value is a form of attributive goodness. In §2-§6 I show that if artistic value is 
indeed a form of attributive goodness, there are important consequences. First, it re-
veals that certain positions about artistic value have a greater burden of proof than 
ordinarily appreciated. This is the focus in §2. Second, it reveals that certain popular 
argumentative moves are fundamentally mistaken. This is the focus in §3-§6. 
Preliminaries 
Three further points about the distinction between attributive and predicative good-
ness. First, it might be tempting to think that attributive goodness is a kind of instru-
mental goodness. But this would be a mistake. Instrumental goodness is a kind of de-
rivative predicative goodness: goodness that something has in virtue of being a means 
to something that is good. It’s plausible that for many kinds K, good Ks can be in-
strumentally good - if education is good, then good schools are instrumentally good; 
if health is good, then good hospitals are instrumentally good. But even if that’s right, 
its not the case that saying of something that it’s a good K amounts to saying that it’s in-
strumentally good. Being a good K, doesn’t automatically entail being instrumentally 
 The notion of a goodness-fixing kind is Thomson’s. See Normativity, p. 21.3
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good. Something further would need to be the case: namely that there is something of 
value that a good K would help to bring about.  
Second, some philosophers - most notably Peter Geach and Judith Thomson - hold 
that there is no such thing as predicative goodness, and that there is only attributive 
goodness.  It’s worth emphasising that this is a pretty radical claim - it’s not (just) the 4
denial that anything is good as an end in itself, or that anything is intrinsically good or 
good all-things-considered. It’s the denial that anything ever is good to any degree, or 
in any respect - accompanied by the proposal that much of what appears to be good-
ness in some respect, and goodness to some degree, and so on, is really just good-K-
ness for some K.   5
In any case, what I argue in this paper is neutral on whether Geach and Thomson are 
right about there being no predicative goodness. And in fact, if they are right, this 
would help my arguments, not hinder them. My central claim is that artistic value is 
not a kind of predicative goodness, but a kind of attributive goodness. If Geach and 
Thomson are right that there is no predicative goodness, then it would definitely be a mis-
take to treat artistic value as a kind of predicative goodness. 
Third, the turn of phrase ‘a good X’ does not necessarily guarantee that what is being 
talked about is attributive goodness, though it is generally a good indicator. One rea-
son for this is that there may be predicative readings of 7-9, but it would take an un-
usual context for the predicative reading to look like the natural one. Suppose I’m a 
jaded ex-dancer, and I am complaining about my colleagues in the profession. I tell 
you, ‘all dancers are bad’. And in saying this, I’m not saying they’re bad at dancing, 
I’m saying they’re bad, simpliciter. In response, you remind me that there are dancers 
we both know who are counterexamples - you mention Jenny - ‘she’s a good dancer,’ 
you say, meaning not to make a claim about her talent at dancing, but to say that she 
is a dancer and that she is good. That would be a context where the predicative read-
ing looks plausible, but most of the time, the construction ‘a good X’ is a good sign 
that it’s attributive goodness, not predicative goodness, that is at issue.  
A further reason is that there may be some kinds K that are vacuously broad - like 
‘thing’, ‘event’ ‘state of affairs’ - where to say that something is a good K is just to 
say it is good. 
Two points about terminology. First, I will use the phrase ‘good simpliciter’ and when I 
want to emphasise that I am talking about predicative goodness. This shouldn’t be 
taken to be referring to only some special kind of predicative goodness - e.g. intrinsic 
goodness, or final value, or goodness-all-things-considered.  
 Geach (1956); Thomson (2008). 4
 Thomson (2008) talks as though being a good K is a respect in which something can be 5
good (p. 17). But I think this is misleading. Something can be a good K without there being 
any respect in which it is good. A pacifist can, without contradiction, describe something as a 
good cluster bomb - this doesn’t commit her to saying there is any respect in which it is good. 
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Second, it is common to use the term ‘value’, and ‘valuable’ as interchangeable, re-
spectively, with ‘goodness’ and ‘good’. It has recently been argued that valuableness 
and goodness are distinct, though related, concepts.  There is, nonetheless, a signifi6 -
cant current of work in aesthetics and ethics that uses ‘value’ as a synonym for ‘good-
ness’ and ‘valuable’ as a synonym for ‘good’, and since I will be engaging with some 
of that work, I follow that usage here for simplicity. 
1. Why Think Artistic Value is Attributive Goodness? 
Artistic value is intimately related to the concept of a good artwork. People use the 
phrase ‘a good artwork’ as interchangeable with ‘has high artistic value’, and ‘in-
creases its artistic value’ as interchangeable with  ‘makes it better art’. The question 
is, is the ‘good’ in ‘good artwork’ being used attributively, or is it like my dancer ex-
ample above?  
The first thing to note is that the construction ‘a good X’ constitutes a presumptive 
case for thinking that the ‘good’ here is attributive. Generally, we need a somewhat 
unusual context to get a predicative reading from a construction of the form ‘a good 
X’, as with the ‘good dancer’ example above. So in the absence of arguments for 
thinking that the ‘good’ in ‘good art’ should be read predicatively, we should read it 
attributively.  
While the above alone may be enough, there are, in addition, several considerations 
that directly support the claim that artistic value is attributive goodness. First, when 
explaining what they mean by ‘artistic value’ philosophers typically resort to exactly 
the kinds of phrases that are standardly used to explain what attributive goodness, as 
opposed to predicative goodness, amounts to. They say things like: 
 The value of an artwork as art 
 Value of an artwork qua art/qua artwork  
 The value of an artwork considered as art 
 The value an artwork has when evaluated as art. 
Second, if artistic value is attributive goodness this offers a natural explanation for 
why artistic value can’t be had, to any degree, by things that are not artworks.  
Third, it also offers a natural explanation for why not every artwork that is a good thing 
is good art, and why not everything that is good about an artwork increases its artistic 
value. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin played a role in bringing about the 
abolition of slavery, and that is a good thing about it, but it is at least not obvious that 
this makes it a better novel. This is exactly what we should expect if artistic value is 
attributive goodness. Generally, being an X and good is no guarantee of being a good 
X, and not all good qualities of something that is in fact an X increase how good an X 
 Grant [unpublished manuscript].6
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it is.  We don’t think, for example, that all of the qualities that are good about an ob-
ject that is in fact a letter-opener, also contribute to its being a good letter-opener; or 
that all of the qualities that are good about a person who is in fact an athlete, also con-
tribute to her being a good athlete. 
In contrast, someone who denied that artistic value was attributive goodness would 
face a challenge of supplying an alternative explanation of why some good properties 
of artworks do, and others don’t, contribute to their artistic value. This is not to say 
that the challenge is not meetable, but it is at least not obvious how to meet it, and it’s 
a challenge that those who hold that artistic value is attributive goodness don’t face.  
2. What follows if Artistic Value is Attributive Goodness? 
If artistic value is attributive goodness, then some standard ways of talking and think-
ing about artistic value may need to be re-examined. First, there has been a strong 
temptation in philosophical aesthetics to think that getting clear on the nature of artis-
tic value will also tell us something about why artworks are important, why they are 
valuable. Relatedly, an overwhelming number of philosophers who discuss artistic 
value use the term ‘artistic value’ as interchangeable with ‘the value of art’, or with 
‘the value of an artwork’.  But if artistic value is attributive goodness, it’s not so clear 7
that this is right. The question of how valuable a given artwork is is one thing; the 
question of how good an artwork it is, is another. And the question of how, if at all, 
these two are linked is a substantive one.  
Second, it is extremely common to talk about artistic value as though it is a kind of 
value. And as though investigating the nature of artistic value is a matter of looking 
through all the different types of value that artworks can have, and figuring out which 
one is the artistic one: 
 A work of art can have many different kinds of value—a cognitive value, a 
 social value, an educational value, a historical value, a sentimental value, an 
 economic value, a therapeutic value; it can possess as many kinds of value as 
 there are points of view from which it can be evaluated. What an artist tries to 
 do is to create a product with a distinctive kind of value. He attempts to make 
 something valuable as art […] I shall call this value ‘artistic   
 value’ or the value of a work of art as a work of  art.  8
 What would separate a distinctively artistic value from other sorts of  
 value?  9
 Dickie (1989), especially the introduction; Sharpe (2000) throughout and esp p. 321; Levin7 -
son (1992); Pratt (2012a), (2012b); Shelley (2010)
 Budd (1995), p. 1.8
 Pratt (2012a) p. 5919
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 If there is [..] a properly artistic sort of value […].   10
 The practices of making and responding to art are partly defined by the  
 distinctive kind of value to which they are directed: artistic value as  
 opposed to economic, prudential, cognitive, and so on value.  11
 […] in calling an artwork a good one, we must be attributing some form of 
 value to it, and that this must be a distinctive and special form, properly  
 labeled ‘aesthetic’.   12
In the same spirit, philosophers sometimes raise the question of whether artistic value 
is intrinsic or extrinsic value.   Some go further and talk of artistic value as a kind of 13
value that is somehow distinctive of or unique to art: 
  
 […] a type of aesthetic value that distinguishes artworks at the same time as 
 it provides a criterion for their evaluation  14
But if artistic value is attributive goodness, there’s an important sense in which it’s not 
a kind of value at all. Sure, we can call kinds of attributive goodness ‘kinds of value’, 
but in at least one standard use of the term ‘value’, there’s something very odd about 
saying that for any K, the property of being a good K is a kind of value. That’s be-
cause (for at least one standard use of ‘value’) it’s very odd to say that being a good 
cluster bomb is a kind of value, or that being a good torture method, or a good way to 
lose friends and alienate people, or a good way to get the economy to spiral into cri-
sis, are kinds of value. If you asked someone to list some things that have value, you 
wouldn’t expect any of the things above to feature on their list! 
The lesson from this is that, in at least one standard sense of ‘value’ attributive good-
ness is not a kind of value. Something’s being a good K is one thing; its having value 
is another.  
Perhaps it will be objected that even though it’s not the case that all forms of attribu-
tive goodness are kinds of value, it could still be the case that some forms of attributive 
goodness are, and maybe artistic value is one such form. But this is a claim that would 
need to be argued for - it can’t just be assumed.  
And it might be harder to argue this than it may seem. Accepting the view under con-
sideration would require sacrificing simplicity. A simpler view would say: there are 
 Huddleston (2012)) p. 70510
 Eldridge (2014), p. 176. 11
 Beardsley (1981) p. lix. See also Lopes (2011).12
 McGregor (2014),  p. 464. See also ‘Goldman (2014), p. 95. Stecker (1997), pp. 252-8; 13
Davies, S. (2006), pp. 188-190; Kieran (2013). 
 Goldman (2004), p. 95. See also Haskins (2000) p. 2; Beardsley (1981) p. lix.14
  !6
different kinds of value that things can have. Some of these may contribute to their 
being good Ks, for some kinds K. But being a good K, for some kind, K, is not a fur-
ther kind of value they have, on top of whatever other kinds of value they have. The 
view now under consideration is more complicated: it says that for some kinds K, be-
ing a good K is a further kind of value they have; while for other kinds, Kʹ , being a 
good Kʹ is not a further kind of value they have. Why prefer the more complicated 
view? 
A third, related consequence of artistic value being attributive goodness is that it 
would supply a new way to argue against the traditional view that artistic value is aes-
thetic value. Plausibly, aesthetic value is not a kind of attributive goodness - it’s a kind 
of goodness simpliciter. If that’s right, then by Leibniz’s Law, artistic value cannot be 
the same thing as aesthetic value. If artistic value is attributive goodness, someone 
who wants to resist this argument would have to argue that aesthetic value, too, is a 
kind of attributive goodness. 
You might think that these are fairly pedantic points: we ought to refrain from identify-
ing the artistic value of a work with its value, or with some particular kind of value it 
possesses, such as aesthetic value. But this leaves open that artistic value might none-
theless be intimately related to value, or to some kind of value such as aesthetic value. In 
2.1 I suggest that the thesis that artistic value is attributive goodness has striking im-
plications for this issue too.  
2.1 ARTISTIC VALUE AND ITS DETERMINANTS 
For any kind of attributive goodness, you can ask what its determinants are. What fea-
tures are relevant to how good a tin-opener something is? Or to how good a school 
something is? If artistic value is attributive goodness, it is no different.  
One question we can ask about artistic value’s determinants is: must the features that 
contribute to an artwork’s artistic value also contribute to its predicative goodness - 
must they all be good things about it? Call a ‘yes’ answer to this question the Necessity 
Claim (NC), because it holds that being a contributor to goodness simpliciter is a nec-
essary condition on being a contributor to artistic value.  
 Necessity Claim (NC) 
 For any quality Q of an artwork, if Q is a determinant of its artistic value, Q 
 must be something that contributes positively to its goodness-simpliciter. 
NC can look like a truism. If you’re thinking of artistic value as a kind of predicative 
goodness, then NC can look like it’s not only true but too trivially so to even be worth 
stating. If artistic value is a kind of goodness-simpliciter, then it would follow that any-
thing that contributes to artistic value contributes to goodness-simpliciter. This tendency 
is helped along by certain ways of talking about artistic value. Talking of artistic value 
as a kind of value, and using the phrase ‘the value of a work of art’ as a way of talking 
  !7
about its artistic value, can make it very easy to think that the properties that con-
tribute to a work’s artistic value must all be values. Relatedly, the widespread practice of 
calling the determinants of artistic value artistic values makes it sound like a contradic-
tion to say ‘X is an artistic value but is valueless’.  
Almost all philosophers who consider the question of what the determinants of artistic 
value are talk as though they accept the necessity claim. For example, it is common to 
characterise the project of settling whether something is a determinant of artistic value 
as a matter of finding out ‘whether a value possessed by an artwork is artistic or 
not’.  Conolly & Haydar (2001) talk about ‘the combination of those values that consti15 -
tute artistic value’.  George Dickie, in a book-length investigation into the nature of 16
artistic value, begins by identifying what he takes to be an exhaustive list of the pos-
sible theories of artistic value. Tellingly, all of them take its determinants to be valu-
able properties.  17
But if artistic value is attributive goodness, the necessity claim is not a truism at all, 
but a substantive claim that cannot be assumed without argument. With attributive 
goodness in general, it is illegitimate to assume that features that contribute to some-
thing’s attributive goodness, must be features that make it good simpliciter. Consider 
how odd it would be to assume that the things that make something a good tin-opener 
must all be good things, or, worse still, that the things that make something a good 
weapon, assassination plot, or torture method must be good things.  
Defenders of NC might accept this general point about attributive goodness, but main-
tain that nonetheless, some forms of attributive goodness might be such that the NC 
holds: there are some kinds K such that the properties that make something a good K 
also make it good simpliciter.  And it might be that art is such a kind. But an argument 18
would be required for this claim; it’s not something we can just assume. Since the ne-
cessity claim is not in general true of attributive goodness, we should take seriously 
the possibility that it’s not true of artistic value - not just assume it must be true and 
that it doesn’t need argument. 
Not only does NC have a burden of proof, there are also reasons to doubt its truth. 
Critical and appreciative practice suggests the necessity claim is false. Art critics often 
talk as though disturbingness, and chillingness are positive contributors to artistic val-
ue, and it’s hard to see why we should take these to be contributors to goodness sim-
pliciter. And some take it to be a mark of great art that it forces us to confront our mor-
tality. But again it is not obvious that this is something good simpliciter about it.  
 Dodd 2014, p. 39515
 Conolly & Haydar, p. 123. Emphasis mine16
 Dickie 1989. See also Goldman (1998), p. 45; Pratt (2012a), pp. 591-592; Stecker (1997a), 17
pp. 260-1; Stecker (2013).
 It’s plausible, for example, that the qualities that make someone a good friend are qualities 18
that make them good simpliciter to some degree. 
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So one way in which the thesis that artistic value is attributive goodness would 
change the landscape in aesthetics is that it would expose NC as a substantive claim. 
In the rest of this section I’ll suggest that it also reveals that certain standard ways of 
talking about artistic value also have other substantive assumptions built into them.  
First, some ways of talking about artistic value suggest not only NC but also the more 
obviously implausible converse claim: 
 Sufficiency Claim (SC): 
 For any quality Q of an artwork, if Q contributes positively to its goodness-per-
	 se, Q is a determinant of its artistic value. That is, being a contributor to  
 goodness-per-se in an artwork is sufficient for being a contributor to its artistic 
 value. 
The tendency to use the phrase ‘the value of a work of art’ as a way of talking about 
something’s artistic value, for example, can make it sound as though not only NC but 
also SC holds.  
No one explicitly endorses SC. In fact, many explicitly reject it: as discussed in 1.2, it 
is widely acknowledged that lots of properties can make an artwork good simpliciter, 
that have no bearing on how good it is as art.  But surprisingly, as I’ll suggest in §3, 19
§4,  and §6, there has nonetheless been a tendency to unreflectively accept SC. There 
I will discuss some arguments that are largely taken seriously in aesthetics, that rely 
on SC. I think it is the failure to keep clearly in mind that artistic value is attributive 
goodness, helped by the tendency to use ‘the value of a work of art’ as a way of talking 
about something’s artistic value, that explains why this tacit acceptance of SC has 
gone unnoticed. 
Second, sometimes people talk as though a thesis that I’ll call distinctivism holds - that 
artistic value is determined by a particular kind of value that is only had by art.  
Consider again Goldman’s claim that artistic value must be ‘[…] a type of aesthetic 
value that distinguishes artworks at the same time as it provides a criterion for their 
evaluation’.  If what I argued above is right, then artistic value is not a type of value 20
at all. But now read Goldman as talking not about artistic value itself, but about its 
determinants - as saying that artistic value is determined by ‘a type of aesthetic value 
that distinguishes artworks at the same time as it provides a criterion for their evalua-
tion’. Read this way, Goldman would be endorsing distinctivism. He would also be 
endorsing NC and aestheticism: the thesis that artistic value is determined only be 
aesthetic value.  
 See, for example, Stecker (2003), p. 311; Stecker (2005), p. 10;  Goldman (2004), p. 95. A 19
recent debate in aesthetics is premised on the falsity of the sufficiency claim. Lopes (2011) 
asks: since artworks can have valuable properties that are irrelevant to their artistic value, 
how are we to draw a principled line between the values that contribute to artistic value, and 
the values that don’t? For responses see Huddleston (2012); Dodd (2013), (2014); Stecker 
(2012); Stecker (2015). 
 Goldman (2004), p. 95. See also Haskins (2000) p. 2; Beardsley (1981) p. lix.20
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Even without NC and aestheticism, however, distinctivism is a very strong claim. And 
if artistic value is attributive goodness, it’s not clear why distinctivism should be ac-
cepted. We don’t in general think that the qualities that make some X a good X must 
all be qualities that only Xs have. Precision and skill in arguing are plausibly relevant 
to how good a philosopher someone is, but it would take a peculiarly conceited 
philosopher to deny that these are skills that many people have who aren’t philoso-
phers. 
More plausible is what I’ll call weak distinctivism: the thesis that the determinants of 
artistic value must be qualities that in combination are only had by artworks.  But it’s 21
not obvious that even weak distinctivism is true. Attributive goodness in general 
doesn’t appear to behave this way. Plausibly, just as there’s no reason a non-philoso-
pher can’t be precise and skilled in arguing, there’s also nothing to stop a non-
philosopher having all the qualities that would make someone who was in fact a 
philosopher a good philosopher. 
It’s easy to see why someone who thinks of artistic value as a kind of predicative 
goodness might be drawn to distinctivism. If you take seriously the thought that only 
artworks can have artistic value, and you are thinking of artistic value as a kind of 
predicative goodness, then there is no option but to accept that it’s a kind of predica-
tive goodness that only artworks have. But if artistic value is a kind of attributive 
goodness the motivation for distinctivism is undercut. If artistic value is just goodness 
as art, there is a clear explanation of why only artworks can have it: only artworks can 
be good artworks - just as only cars can be good cars. 
My point here isn’t that distinctivism must be false. Perhaps there are good arguments 
for distinctivism. My point is just that arguments would need to be given: it shouldn’t 
be accepted as so obviously true as not to require argument. 
In §1 I argued that artistic value is attributive goodness. In this section I’ve suggested 
that if this is correct, it is has some striking consequences: it promises to shift the 
terms of certain debates about artistic value. Theses about the determinants of artistic 
value that have enjoyed the status of truisms - most notably the necessity claim - 
would in fact stand in need of argument. And others, such as distinctivism, are less 
well-motivated than they initially appear. In Sections 3-6 I discuss in detail three fur-
ther debates in which the recognition that artistic value is attributive goodness 
promises to shed important light.  
 Berys Gaut considers the possibility of weak distinctivism in Gaut (2007), p. 172. Conolly 21
& Haydar (2001) appear to endorse weak distinctivism, p. 123.
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3. Empiricism and Instrumentalism 
A popular view is that the artistic value of an artwork is determined by the value of 
the experience it occasions in observers who understand the work.  Call this view 22
empiricism about artistic value. A popular objection to empiricism is that it renders art-
works replaceable by anything that is capable of providing the (qualitatively) same 
experience. The thought is that if you think that what matters about an artwork is the 
experience it provides, then this looks to commit you to saying that if one could get 
that same experience from a drug, or from being hooked up to a Nozickian experience 
machine, then nothing important would be lost by replacing the artwork with the drug, 
or the machine. Call this the replaceability objection. 
The Replaceability Objection: 
 1. If empiricism (or instrumentalism, more broadly) is true, then the  
    determinants of a work’s artistic value are properties that something other 
     than the work can have. (Premise) 
 2. If the determinants of a work’s artistic value are properties that something 
     other than the work can have, then the work is (in principle) replaceable 
     without loss of value. (Premise) 
 3. Artworks are not replaceable without loss of value. (Premise) 
 4. So the determinants of artistic value cannot be properties that something 
     other than the work can have (Modus Tollens, from 2, 3) 
 5. So instrumentalism is false (Modus Tollens, from 1, 4) 
In fact, the replaceability objection is taken to threaten not just empiricism, but any 
theory that takes the artistic value of a work to be determined by some instrumental 
value that it has - such as cognitive value, or ‘refining moral feeling or raising politi-
cal consciousness’,  or some combination thereof. 23
Most people take the replaceability objection seriously. Empiricists, and instrumental-
ists more broadly, treat it as a challenge to which they must have something to say, 
and their opponents tend to use it as the central pillar of a conclusive argument against 
them.   24
Those who dispute the argument tend to focus their efforts on disputing premise 1, 
although some have contested premise 3.  To my knowledge, no one takes issue with 25
premise 2. But if artistic value is attributive goodness, premise 2 is highly dubious. I 
 See, for example, Budd (1995); Graham (2006). For critical discussion of the view, see 22
Sharpe (2000); Shelley (2010).
 These examples come from Haskins (2000), p. 2.23
 See Haskins (2000); Kieran (2013); Conolly & Haydar (2001), p. 123; Sharpe (2000); 24
Levinson (1992), pp. 303-4; Shelley (2010); Budd (1980), pp. 39-41; (1985), pp 123-4; 
(1995), pp. 13-16; Graham 1997, p. 56; Davies, D. (2005), p. 25; Goldman (1998) pp. 4-5.
 Stecker (1997a): pp. 252-258.25
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think that the reason 2 has been taken to be innocuous is that it appears at first blush 
to be an instance of the following plausible principle: 
 Value Replaceabilty (VR): If the properties in virtue of which an object O  i s 
 valuable are properties that something other than O could have, then O is in 
 principle replaceable without loss of value.   
But if artistic value is attributive goodness, then VR lends no support to 2. VR is a 
principle concerning predicative goodness. To assume that Premise 2 follows from 
VR would be to assume the Sufficiency Claim, that every quality that contributes to a 
work’s goodness simpliciter must also contribute to its artistic value. But as I argued in 
Section 2 (and as pretty much everyone in fact acknowledges) the sufficiency claim is 
false. Artworks can have properties that make them valuable but do not bear on their 
artistic value. But if this is right, then even if all the properties that bear on a given 
artwork’s artistic value can be had by other things, it doesn’t follow that all the prop-
erties that make it valuable can be had by other things. And so empiricists (and instru-
mentalists more broadly) incur no commitment to saying that the work is replaceable 
without loss of value. As it stands, then, the replaceability objection is unconvincing, 
even if 1 and 3 are true. At the very least, those who make the replaceability objec-
tion, would need to supply an alternative argument for Premise 2. 
This is good news for artistic empiricists, but the recognition that artistic value is at-
tributive goodness isn’t an unequivocal good for artistic empiricists. As I argue in the 
next section, a major advantage that empiricists claim for their theory is also illusory, 
if artistic value is attributive goodness. 
4. The Explanatory Advantage Argument for Empiricism 
Philosophers sometimes suggest that an advantage of empiricism is that empiricists 
can supply an answer to the question of why the things they take to be determinative of 
artistic value are valuable. James Shelley, for example, puts the point as follows: 
 Suppose [a non-empiricist] is asked to explain the value of the Allegro of  
 Mozart’s Twenty-Ninth. She will reply […] that it is valuable in virtue of some 
 subset of its properties […].  But just what makes just these properties  
 valuable? The empiricist has an answer.  26
Call this the explanatory advantage argument for empiricism. The thought is that the 
empiricist can say that the work is valuable in virtue of the fact that it gives rise to a 
valuable experience: the work’s value is explained in terms of the value of the experi-
 Shelley (2010), p. 715. Although Shelley rejects empiricism he takes this argument serious26 -
ly. His view is that empiricism does have an advantage in this respect, but that it is out-
weighed by significant disadvantages that it has (most notably its vulnerability to the replace-
ability objection, discussed above).
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ence the work is capable of providing. And that the properties that contribute to a 
work’s artistic value are valuable in virtue of the fact that these are the properties that 
ground the work’s capacity to provide this valuable experience. Those who reject em-
piricism, so the argument goes, are at a prima facie disadvantage in that it’s not clear 
that they can offer any explanation of the value of the work. 
The argument rests on a mistake, however. If artistic value is attributive goodness, 
there is no need to explain what makes these properties valuable. Nor even to explain 
what makes it the case that these properties make objects that have them valuable. Unless 
the necessity claim is true, there is no requirement to say that the properties that make 
something good art are properties that make something good simpliciter. So if empiri-
cism does explain why the properties that make something good art make it good sim-
pliciter, it’s not clear that this gives empiricism any kind of advantage. In fact, it may 
be a disadvantage, in that it amounts to a commitment to the necessity claim: if its ri-
vals don’t incur such a commitment, this looks like a prima facie reason to prefer 
them.  27
Perhaps a defender of empiricism might respond with a modified explanatory advan-
tage argument: that the empiricist can explain what makes these properties the determi-
nants of  artistic value. Empiricism, according to this argument, is able to say something 
more explanatory than rival theories because it can answer not only question (i) but 
also (ii):  
(i) What are the determinants of artistic value?  
(ii) Why are they the determinants of artistic value? 
But this, too, is mistaken. Empiricism doesn’t offer any kind of an answer to (ii). It 
might look initially as though empiricism says that the answer to (i) is: ‘the experi-
ence the work affords’, and that the answer to (ii) is: ‘because that experience is valu-
able’. But if artistic value is attributive goodness, the (ii) answer is no answer at all. 
The fact that some feature of an artwork is valuable is no guarantee that it’ll be in any 
way relevant to artistic value. To assume otherwise would be to assume the sufficien-
cy claim.  
Perhaps its true that non-empiricist approaches always only answered (i), but now 
we’ve seen that empiricism only answers (i) too. So this is no point of contrast be-
tween the rival theories, and so no reason to prefer empiricism to its rivals. If artistic 
value is attributive goodness, then, the apparent explanatory advantage of empiricism 
over rival theories disappears. 
 You might think that if empiricists can explain why the properties that make something 27
good art are good simpliciter, this wouldn’t commit them to the Necessity Claim, but only to 
the weaker claim that all the properties that make something good art are as a matter of fact 
properties that make it good simpliciter, although this might not hold necessarily. But the 
same considerations apply here. Namely, it’s not clear why this should be taken to be a neutral 
datum that needs to be explained, and hence an advantage for empiricsts, rather than a com-
mitment that empiricists incur, and which its rivals do not. 
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5. Realism 
Some philosophers are attracted to a view that I will call value-scepticism. Value-
scepticism holds that there are no values - if we drew up a list of all the things that 
exist, whatever else it contained, it would not contain values. Value-scepticism consti-
tutes a popular motivation for rejecting realism about morality, and about beauty.  28
The argument would go like this: 
 P1. Moral realism holds that moral goodness genuinely exists 
 P2. Moral goodness is a value 
 P3. There are no values (value-scepticism) 
 C. Moral realism is false 
 P1*. Realism about beauty holds that beauty genuinely exists 
 P2*. Beauty is a value 
 P3*. There are no values (value-scepticism) 
 C*. Realism about beauty is false 
P1-2 together amount to the claim that moral realism is committed to the existence of 
values. P1*-2* together amount to the claim that realism about beauty is committed to 
the existence of values. Add to either of these the value-scepticism claim, that there 
are no values, and you have an argument against realism of the relevant kind. 
It is sometimes assumed that the same kind of argument can be made against realism 
about artistic value.  However, if artistic value is attributive goodness, as I have ar29 -
gued, such an argument would be unsuccessful. Value-sceptics, while they may deny 
that anything can really be morally good or beautiful, do not have to deny that some-
thing can be a good X. They can accept that there can be good job applications, good 
bombs, good tin-openers, and so on. They just have to deny that any part of what 
makes something a good job application, good tin-opener, etc. is its possession of 
some kind of metaphysically dubious value. And this is not especially hard for the 
value-sceptic to do. After all, we already accept that for some Xs, being a good X is 
compatible with a complete lack of goodness of the kind that worries the value-sceptic. 
Plausibly, no part of calling something a good bomb, for example, involves commit-
ting to its being good in any respect.  
So if artistic value is attributive goodness, there is no straightforward route from val-
ue-scepticism to antirealism about artistic value. Unlike realism about beauty and 
moral goodness, realism about artistic value does not straightforwardly incur meta-
physical commitments that the value-sceptic has to reject.  
 See Mackie, J L (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin) Olson 2014 28
Moral Error Theory OUP; Streumer, B. (2013) ‘Can we believe the Error Theory?’ Journal of 
Philosophy; Streumer, B. forthcoming Unbelievable Error OUP.
 See, for example, Davies (2006), p. 32; Railton (1998); Bender (2003), p. 87; Goldman 29
(1993); Pratt (2012a), pp. 592-3; Eldridge (2014), pp. 170-171.
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One might object, however, that even if there is no straightforward route from value-
scepticism to antirealism about artistic value, there might still be a route of sorts. Val-
ue-scepticism does not entail antirealism about artistic value on its own, but in conjunc-
tion with the plausible thesis that at least some of the determinants of artistic value are 
values, it would. Most people think that beauty is a determinant of artistic value, for 
example. And beauty looks like a value.  
But this argument is unconvincing. It’s only plausible that some of artistic value’s de-
terminants are values if value-scepticism is false. If value-scepticism is true, then this 
would undermine the thesis that artistic value has values among its determinants. Val-
ue-sceptics should either deny that beauty features on the list of determinants of artis-
tic value (on the grounds that it doesn’t exist), or deny that beauty is a value.  
There isn’t any obvious reason, then, to think that value-sceptics ought to be antireal-
ists about artistic value. Similar considerations apply to what I’ll call moderate value-
scepticism: the view that there are no mind-independent values. The moderate value-
sceptic can accept that there are values, as long as she holds that they are mind-de-
pendent.  
Moderate value-scepticism supplies a motivation for rejecting robust realism about 
moral goodness and beauty, where robust realism about beauty/moral goodness is the 
thesis that beauty/moral goodness is mind-independent. The arguments would go like 
this: 
 P1. Robust moral realism holds that moral goodness exists and is mind-   
        independent 
 P2. Moral goodness is a value 
 P3. There are no mind-independent values 
 C.  Robust moral realism is false 
 P1*. Robust realism about beauty holds that beauty exists and is mind- 
          independent 
 P2*. Beauty is a value 
 P3*. There are no mind-independent values 
 C.    Robust realism about beauty is false 
P1-2 together amount to the claim that robust moral realism is committed to the exis-
tence of mind-independent values. Add to these the moderate value-scepticism claim 
in P3, that no such values exist, and you have an argument against moral realism. P1-
2 together amount to the claim that robust realism about beauty is committed to the 
existence of mind-independent values. Add to these the moderate value-scepticism 
claim in P3, that no such values exist, and you have an argument against robust real-
ism about beauty. 
Moderate value-scepticism might be thought to also supply a motivation for rejecting 
robust realism about artistic value in the same way as the arguments above about 
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moral goodness and beauty.  However, if artistic value is attributive goodness, such 30
an argument would be unsuccessful. If artistic value is attributive goodness, there is 
no pressure - without further premises - to think that committing to the existence and 
mind-independence of artistic value is to commit to anything the moderate value-
sceptic is uncomfortable with. In general, to say that it is a mind-independent matter 
whether something is a good X, is not to commit to the existence of mind-independent 
values. This is because, as we saw above, something can be a good X even if there are 
no values. It follows from this that it can be mind-independent whether something is a 
good X even if there are no mind-independent values.  
There may nonetheless be a route from moderate value scepticism to the mind-depen-
dence of artistic value but it wouldn’t be as direct as the arguments above. It is plausi-
ble that if any of the determinants of artistic value is mind-dependent, then artistic value 
itself would have to also be mind-dependent. If we further assume that artistic value 
has values among its determinants, then we could argue as follows: 
 P1. Artistic value has values among its determinants  
 P2. Values are mind-dependent 
 P3. If artistic value has any mind-dependent determinants, it is mind- 
       dependent 
 C. So artistic value is mind-dependent.  
In any case, however, the argument from moderate value-scepticism against robust 
realism about artistic value is importantly different from the arguments moderate val-
ue-scepticism generates against robust moral realism and robust realism about beauty 
since, crucially, it relies on further premises.  
6. Defining Art 
Some theories define art in terms of qualities about artworks that are valuable. Call 
definitions that have this feature value-definitions. The definitions of art proposed by R 
G Collingwood and by Clive Bell are examples (at least if clarifying and expressing 
emotions and having significant form, respectively, are good things). 
It is widely taken to be a knock-down objection to value-definitions that they cannot 
accommodate bad art. George Dickie, for example, argues that ‘If works of art are 
defined as necessarily valuable, it would make it difficult or impossible to speak of 
bad or worthless art.’  There have been a number of ingenious suggestions for how 31
value-definitions can deal with the objection. Stephen Davies suggests that propo-
nents of value-definitions could say that bad art is only bad relative to other art - it’s 
good really, but it can still be bad compared to other art. Just as someone who is tall really 
 Pratt (2012a), p. 592-3.30
 Dickie (2000), p. 97. See also Stecker (2005), p. 83; Pratt (2012b), p. 148;  S. Davies 31
(2007), pp. 32-33; Wieand (1981).
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can still be a short basketball player, an artwork can be good but still bad art.  Henry 32
Pratt suggests distinguishing two kinds of artistic value.   33
But if artistic value is attributive goodness, the worry about value-definitions is incor-
rect, and the clever defensive moves are unnecessary. There is no tension to be re-
solved between value-definitions and the observation that some art is bad art. Attribu-
tive badness is entirely compatible with goodness simpliciter (something can be good in 
some way, while still being a bad X): a person can be good and a bad dancer, and a 
turn of events that is good might be bad dinner party anecdote material (too boring). 
So if the ‘bad’ in ‘bad art’ is used attributively, then there is room in principle for 
something that is a bad artwork to be good simpliciter.   34
To put it another way: if the sufficiency claim is false (which, as we’ve seen, most 
people accept it is), then not all valuable things about an artwork are determinants of 
its artistic value. So a guarantee that all artworks have some value is not a guarantee 
that all artworks are good art, or indeed that they have any degree of artistic value.  
To be sure, there are definitions of art that cannot allow for bad art, and very often 
these theories happen to be value-definitions. The definitions of art proposed by 
Collingwood and Bell are examples. But it’s not because they are value-definitions 
that they can’t allow for bad art: rather, it’s because of a distinct and entirely separable 
feature they happen to have. Namely, the fact that they take the quality in terms of 
which they define art, to be the sole determinant of artistic value. Call this the defini-
 Davies, S. (2007), p. 32.32
 Pratt (2012b)33
 You might think: Davies’s suggestion that an artwork can be good but still bad art by being 34
good but still bad compared to other art, is a way of acknowledging that artistic value is attribu-
tive goodness. But this is not quite right. One way in which an adjective can be attributive is 
in the way that ‘tall’ is. Being a tall K is different from being tall, because being a tall K is 
just being tall relative to Ks. Call attributive adjectives of this kind Comparison Class Attribu-
tives (CCAs) 
When ‘J’ is a Comparison Class Attributive, the reason something can be J and be a K, with-
out being a J K, is because the kind K in question can set the bar for J-ness particularly high. 
But CCAs are not the only kind of attributive adjective out there. Consider ‘famous’.  ‘Fa-
mous’ has attributive and predicative uses. Someone can be a famous politician, a famous 
tennis player, and they can be just famous full stop. But now consider: someone can be famous, 
and play chess, without being a famous chess player. Is that because chess players are all so 
famous that they set a particularly high standard for fame? No! 
Moreover, ‘good’ when used attributively, doesn’t appear to behave like a CCA.  Rather, 
‘good’ looks more like ‘famous’ in this respect. A person can be good, and a bad dancer, and 
that’s not a matter of being bad simpliciter compared to other dancers. 
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tion-evaluation parallelism.  For Collingwood it’s the expression and clarification of 35
emotion that both secures art-status and determines artistic value, and for Bell it’s the 
having of significant form (and the corresponding production of the aesthetic emo-
tion). 
It’s the definition-evaluation parallelism that renders Bell’s and Collingwood’s theo-
ries unable to accommodate bad art. If one and the same quality is both criterial of art-
status and determinative of artistic value, as definition-evaluation parallelism ensures, 
there cannot be any bad art, since the thing that would need to be lacking for the art to 
be bad art, is also the very thing that no art can lack. 
Some philosophers suggest that definitions of art that have the definition-evaluation 
parallelism have the advantage that they shed light on the question of why art is valu-
able: 
 Some people regard the concept of art as essentially evaluative. Tolstoy was 
 one such. Only good art qualifies as art, he thought. […] By this approach, 
 defining art and analysing what makes art valuable are related like the sides of 
 a coin.  36
But this also is based on conflating the definition-evaluation parallelism with property 
of being value-definition. If artistic value is attributive goodness, then theories with 
the definition-evaluation parallelism tell us something about what makes art good art, 
but (unless the equivalence thesis holds) there is no guarantee they’ll tell us about 
what makes art valuable. 
Consider how odd it would be to apply this line of reasoning for other kinds of at-
tributive goodness: 
 Some people regard the concept of an assassin as essentially evaluative.  
 Only good assassins qualify as assassins, [according to this view] […] By  this 
 approach, defining assassins and analysing what makes assassins  v a l u a b l e 
 are related like the sides of a coin. 
The reasoning is clearly faulty. From the supposition that only good assassins qualify 
as assassins, it wouldn’t follow that there is anything good or valuable about assas-
 I’ve said that very often the two features (being a value-definition, and having the defini35 -
tion-evaluation parallelism) go together. In fact, it might be that historically they have always 
gone together. It’s hard to find examples of definitions of art that have one of these two fea-
tures without the other. But if so, this is a further interesting consequence of artistic value’s 
being attributive goodness: it reveals that there is space for the two to come apart, where pre-
viously they had looked to be inseparable, and perhaps even equivalent. 
 Davies, S. (2006),  p. 190. Alan Goldman also takes the definition-evaluation parallelism to 36
entail that artworks must be of value. See Goldman (2004), p. 93: ‘According to one common 
conception of art, to call something an artwork is already to grant it a positive evaluative sta-
tus. What counts as a genuine work of art must meet some minimum standard of artistic val-
ue, so that minor or mediocre works of art are still better than objects that purport to be works 
of art but do not merit that status.’
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sins. If artistic value is attributive goodness, then an argument would be needed for 
thinking that the reasoning isn’t just as faulty in the art case.  
I’ve argued in this section that if artistic value is attributive goodness, being a  value-
definition and having the definition-evaluation parallelism are not the same thing. 
Given this, an extremely popular objection to value-definitions is mistaken (it’s really 
an objection to the definition-evaluation parallelism), and a consequence that has been 
held to follow from the definition-evaluation parallelism in fact doesn’t obtain (it’s 
only a consequence of value-definitions). 
Conclusion 
I’ve argued that artistic value is a kind of attributive goodness, and that this has far-
reaching and important consequences for a number of debates in aesthetics. First, cer-
tain theses about artistic value that are often taken for granted - the necessity claim, 
distinctivism - turn out to have a greater burden of proof than ordinarily appreciated. 
Second, some popular argumentative moves in debates about the definition of art, re-
alism about artistic value, and artistic empiricism, are fundamentally mistaken.  
References 
Beardsley, M. (1981) Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of  Criticism (Indianapolis: 
Hackett) 
Bender, J. (2005) ‘Aesthetic Realism 2’ in Levinson (ed.) Oxford Handbook of  Aesthetics 
(Oxford: OUP) pp. 80-98. 
Budd, M. (1995) Values of  Art (London: Penguin).  
Budd, M. (1980) ‘The Repudiation of Emotion: Hanslick on Music’, British Journal of  
Aesthetics 20(1): pp. 29-43. 
Conolly & Haydar (2001) ‘Narrative Art and Moral Knowledge’ British Journal of  Aes-
thetics 41(2): 109-124. 
Davies, D. (2005) ‘Against Enlightened Empiricism’, in M. Kieran (ed.) Contemporary 
Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of  Art, (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 22-34. 
Davies, S (2006) Foundations of  the Philosophy of  Art (Blackwell) 
Davies, S. (2007) Philosophical Perspectives on Art (OUP). 
  !19
Dickie, G. (1989) Evaluating Art (Temple University Press). 
Dickie, G. (2000) ‘Two Versions of the Institutional Theory,’ in N. Carroll (Ed.) Theo-
ries of  Art Today (University of Wisconsin Press), pp. 93-108. 
Dodd, J. (2014) ‘On a Proposed Test for Artistic Value’ British Journal of  Aesthetics 
54(4): 395-407. 
Eldridge, R. (2014) An Introduction to the Philosophy of  Art (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press). 
Fenner, D. (2004) ‘Artistic Value’ Journal of  Value Inquiry 37:555-563. 
Gaut, B. (2007) Art, Emotion, and Ethics (Oxford: OUP). 
Geach, P. (1956) ‘Good and Evil’ Analysis 17(2): 33-42. 
Goldman, A. (2004) ‘Evaluating Art’ in P. Kivy (Ed.) Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics (Ox-
ford: Blackwell), pp. 93-108. 
Goldman, A. (1998) Aesthetic Value (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 
Goldman, A. (1993) ‘Realism about Aesthetic Properties’ Journal of  Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 51(1): 31-37. 
Graham, G. (1997) Philosophy of  the Arts, (London: Routledge)  
Graham, G. (2006) ‘Aesthetic Empiricism and the Challenge of Fakes and Ready-
mades’ in Kieran (Ed.) Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of  Art (Oxford: 
Blackwell), pp. 11-21. 
Grant J. ‘Being Valuable and Being Good’ [unpublished manuscript]. 
Haskins, C. (2000) ‘Paradoxes of Autonomy’ Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58(1): 
1-22. 
Huddleston, A. (2012) ‘In Defense of Artistic Value’ Philosophical Quarterly 62(249): 
705-714. 
Iseminger, G. (2004) The Aesthetic Function of Art (Ithaca: Cornell UP)  
Kagan, S. (1998) ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’ Journal of  Ethics 2(4): 277-297. 
Kieran, M. (2013) ‘Value of Art’ in B. Gaut & D. Lopes (eds.) Routledge Companion to 
Aesthetics (Routledge), pp. 290-296. 
Korsgaard, K. (1983) ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’ Philosophical Review 92(2): 
169-195. 
  !20
Levinson, J. (1992) ’Pleasure and the Value of Works of Art’ British Journal of  Aesthetics 
32(4): 295-306. 
Lopes, D. (2011) ‘The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value’ Philosophical Quarterly 
61(244): 518-536. 
McGregor, R. (2014)  ‘A Critique of the Value Interaction Debate’ British Journal of  
Aesthetics 54(4): 449-466. 
Pratt. H. (2012a) ‘Artistic Institutions, Valuable Experiences: Coming to Terms with 
Artistic Value’ Philosophia 40(3): 591-606. 
Pratt, H. (2012b) ‘Respect, Recognition, and Appraisal: Are All Artworks Valuable’ 
Journal of  Value Inquiry 46: 157-158. 
Railton, P. (1998) ‘Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism’, 
in Levinson (ed.) Aesthetics and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 59-
105. 
Sharpe, R. (2000) ‘The Empiricist Theory of Artistic Value’ Journal of  Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 58: 321-32. 
Shelley, J. (2003) ‘The Problem of Non-Perceptual Art’ British Journal of  Aesthetics 
43(4): 363-378. 
Shelley, J. (2010) ‘Against Value Empiricism in Aesthetics’, Australasian Journal of  Phi-
losophy 88: 707-10.  
Stang, N. (2012) ‘Artworks are Not Valuable for Their Own Sake’ Journal of  Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism pp. 271-280. 
Stecker, R. (1997a) Artworks: Definition, Meaning and Value (University Park, PA: Penn-
sylvania State University Press). 
Stecker, R. (2005) ’Value in Art’ in Levinson (ed.) Oxford Handbook of  Aesthetics (OUP) 
pp. 307-324. 
Stecker, R. (2013) ‘Testing Artistic Value: A Reply to Dodd’ Journal of  Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 71 (3):288-289. 
Stecker, R. (1997b) ‘Two Conceptions of Artistic Value’ Iyyun 46: 51-62. 
Stecker, R. (2012) ‘Artistic Value Defended’ Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70(4): 
355-362. 
Thomson, J. (2008) Normativity (Peru, IL: Open Court).  
  !21
Wieand, J. (1981)  ‘Quality in Art’ British Journal of  Aesthetics: 21(4): 330-335. 
  !22
